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Abstract. In August 2020, FOMC chair Jerome Powell announced a strategy for achieving 
an inclusive value of the FOMC’s goal of maximum employment. The strategy rests on 
discovering the minimal value of sustainable unemployment by running the economy 
above potential until the unemployment rate declines to a level that initiates an inflation 
overshoot from the FOMC’s longer-run 2 percent target. There is presumably no 
contradiction with an FOMC target for inflation of 2 percent. As indicated by the 
appellation “flexible-average-inflation targeting” (FAIT), the inflation overshoot would 
compensate for prior undershoots of the 2 percent target. The FOMC’s current framework 
is reminiscent of the 1970s. With a country fractured over the Vietnam War and a militant 
civil rights movement, a socially desirable low unemployment rate became a political 
imperative. FOMC chairman Arthur Burns accepted the challenge (Hetzel 1998, 2008, Ch. 
8). The Keynesian consensus of the time promised to deliver a socially desirable rate of 
unemployment at least as low as 4 percent at the cost of only moderate inflation. This 
desirable Phillips curve trade-off between unemployment and inflation became the 
centerpiece of monetary policy. Modigliani & Papademos (1975 and 1976) provided the 
organizing principle for monetary policy. Namely, there is a predictable and “exploitable” 
trade-off in which changes in inflation depend upon the difference between the 
unemployment rate and a full-employment rate termed the nonaccelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment (NAIRU). At least in 2021, however, the FOMC assumption is that there 
is no trade-off because the Phillips curve is assumed flat at least down to its prepandemic 
low of 3.5%. When persistent inflation above 2% emerges, the adjective “flexible” in FAIT 
becomes relevant. The FOMC will then trade off between two competing goals – 2% 
inflation and inclusive maximum employment. 
Keywords. Quantity theory, Monetary policy. 
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1. Introduction  
he bulge in the monetary aggregate M2 of 26% from January 2020 to 
January 2021 is unprecedented apart from wartime.  The size of the 
increase suggests a surge in inflation, perhaps with the two-year lag 
documented by Milton Friedman (1989).  The quantity theory perspective 
offered here comprises two parts. (A third part reviews the characterization 
of monetary policy offered by FOMC participants.)  The first part argues that 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should discipline its policy by 
the need to unwind the bulge in money.  The FOMC would need to reverse 
its decision to abandon the Pau Volcker/Alan Greenspan policy of 
 
1† Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (retired), USA. 
 . 804-697-8213 . robert.hetzel@rich.frb.org 
T 
Turkish Economic Review 
R.L Hetzel, TER, 8(3), 2021, p.77-96. 
78 
preemptive increases in the funds rate, that is, increases to forestall rather 
than respond to realized inflation. 
As of early 2021, financial markets were assuming that the bulge in liquid 
savings built up during the pandemic will result in a surge of spending due 
to pent-up demand as the service sector reopens. There will be a desirable 
one-time increase in spending and in the price level.  For a one-time increase 
in spending to occur, the FOMC must eliminate the additional purchasing 
power represented by the bulge in M2 through reducing its nominal 
quantity. The alternative is for the additional purchasing power to dissipate 
through an undesirably large increase in inflation.  To  reduce the nominal 
quantity of M2, the FOMC must be ready to implement some combination 
of asset sales and of increases in the funds rate sufficient to cause households 
to repay bank debt. 
The second part exposits the quantity theory that underlies the critique of 
monetary policy made in the first part. It does so in a way that takes account 
of the FOMC’s operating procedures that incorporate a funds rate target and 
interest on reserves (IOR) as well as quantitative easing (QE) through the 
purchase of Treasury securities and mortgage-backed-securities (MBS). The 
exposition uses the Goodfriend-King (1997) version of the New Keynesian 
(NK) model.  In this version, price stickiness is the key friction.  A policy of 
price stability then removes the friction, and the real business cycle core of 
the economy determines real variables. The economy exhibits a “classical 
dichotomy” in that real variables are determined independently of the price 
level. A credible rule that provides for a stable nominal anchor and that 
allows the price system to determine real variables as a consequence of 
procedures that cause the real funds rate to track the natural rate of interest 
guarantees the monetary control required for real and nominal stability. 
The steady flow of commentary from FOMC participants makes clear that 
FOMC discussion is organized around the exploitation of the possibilities 
offered by a Phillips curve assumed flat down to a level of unemployment 
likely lower than the 3.5% that existed at the onset of the pandemic. (The 
final section reproduces commentary by FOMC participants to support this 
characterization.) Such a monetary policy is reminiscent of the 1970s.  
Inflation is a nonmonetary phenomenon in that it depends upon real 
variables—the degree of slack in the economy and cost push shocks (or cost 
pull shocks due to globalization).  The FOMC exercises the high degree of 
control required to move aggregate demand and output and thus 
unemployment predictably along a Phillips curve. The issues raised by the 
FOMC’s new strategy of FAIT are the same as those that arose in the 1970s 
monetarist-Keynesian debate.   
 
2. The money bulge in 2020 – precursor to inflation? 
Households are now sitting on a massive amount of liquid assets 
accumulated since the start of the pandemic in March 2020. That 
accumulation of liquid assets reflects an exceptionally high personal saving 
rate out of disposable personal income. When confidence returns, 
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households will spend down those their liquid assets.  The Fed is sanguine 
about that outcome. Because it views the economy as possessing significant 
excess capacity, a surge in spending is desirable. A one-time, measured 
increase in spending and prices will restore the unemployment rate to its 
prepandemic historically low value. A surge in spending will buoy firms’ 
bottom lines and initially will also buoy equity prices.  That will make 
monetary policy more expansionary with the funds rate at the ZLB. 
The following discusses whether the surge in spending will be a 
controlled, transitory surge. The first part reviews the buildup in liquid 
assets. At issue is the role of the Fed in determining the extent to which the 
accumulation in liquid assets represents persistent money creation, which 
will produce inflation. The question is whether that money creation will 
dissipate with the spending surge or whether it will remain as “helicopter 
money” and stimulate spending until inflation erodes its real value. The 
answer depends upon the willingness of the FOMC to raise the funds rate 
and sell securities from its portfolio to extinguish the bank deposits 
underlying the surge in liquid savings in the form of bank deposits. 
Figure 1 shows personal income starting in January 2018. The graph 
hardly suggests a recession.  Yet, real GDP declined 3.5% (annual level) in 
2020 from 2019. As shown in Figure 2, employee compensation at the end of 
2020 remained near its prepandemic level. The boost to personal income 
came from government transfer payments in the form of unemployment 
benefits, Cares Act stimulus checks, and the Payroll Protection Program.  For 
example, personal income was $18,973 billion in January 2020 and $21,093 
billion in April 2020 when the Cares checks went out (annual rates, BEA 
National Income and Product Accounts). 
 
 
Figure 1. Personal Income 
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Figure 2. Compensation of Employees, Received: Wage and Salary Disbursements 
 
Because of the virus, much of the service sector could no longer offer 
hygienically safe products. As shown in Figure 3, households cut back on 
their expenditures in the service sector, such as restaurants, leisure and 
hospitality, and sports events. The combination of expanded personal 
income and reduced consumption necessarily shows up in the personal 
saving rate (Figure 4).   
 
 
Figure 3. Personal Consumption Expenditures 
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Figure 4. Personal Saving Rate 
 
Households saved a large proportion of their stimulus checks.  
Opportunity Insights (Chetty, Friedman, & Stepner, 2021) used estimates of 
spending from the initial Cares stimulus checks showing that higher-income 
households saved most of their checks.  They estimated for the COVID-
Related Tax Relief Act of 2020 passed December 23, 2020 “that $200 billion 
of additional government expenditure will lead to only $15 billion of 
additional spending.” However, households will spend down these savings 
accumulated since March 2020 on services not currently available when 
confidence returns with widespread vaccination. 
An analogy to the current period is wartime. In World War II, given the 
unavailability of consumer durables with rationing, households saved for 
the end of the war and the renewed availability of consumer goods. Given 
low interest rates and the desire for liquid savings, households accumulated 
money balances in the form of the monetary aggregate M2. After the end of 
World War I and II, inflation surged.  In 2020, M2 also surged.  From January 
2020 through January 2021, M2 rose by $4.0 trillion, or 26.2%. When 
confidence returns and the service sector reopens completely, households 
will attempt to run down the bulge in purchasing power represented by the 
M2 bulge. 
The first way in which the bulge in purchasing power represented by the 
bulge in M2 can be reversed is through a reduction in the quantity of M2. For 
that reduction to happen, households and corporations must repay bank 
debt and thus extinguish deposits. An increase in interest rates would 
provide the incentive to pay down debt (save). The FOMC can limit the 
required increase in interest rates by selling securities thereby extinguishing 
the dollar value of deposits. The second way to undo the bulge in purchasing 
power represented by the bulge in M2 is through inflation. 
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Figure 5. M2 
 
To control money creation, the Fed must perform two tasks. First, it must 
provide a stable “nominal anchor.” In a paper money standard, money 
possesses value because people expect it to have value in the future.  The 
ideal is the expectation of price stability. Second, the Fed must let the price 
system work by setting the intemporal price of goods (the real interest rate) 
at a value (the natural rate of interest) that causes the contemporaneous 
demand for resources to equal available supply. When households are 
pessimistic about the future as in recession, the interest rate must be 
cyclically low to counter the desire to transfer resources from the present to 
the future to provide for an uncertain future. A low interest rate should 
discourage savings. When households are optimistic about the future as in a 
boom, the interest rate must be cyclically high to counter the desire to 
transfer resources from the future to the present to bring forward the good 
times.  (A high interest rate should encourage savings.) 
Balance between supply and demand in the goods market implies balance 
between supply and demand in the bond market. On the one hand, this 
balance avoids a too high interest rate and the concomitant need to offset a 
lack of supply of bonds (debt), which the Fed meets by selling bonds and, in 
the process, extinguishing bank deposits, thereby requiring deflation. On the 
other hand, this balance also avoids a too low interest rate and the 
concomitant need to monetize an excess supply of bonds (debt), which the 
Fed meets by buying bonds and, in the process, creating an excess of bank 
deposits, thereby requiring inflation. 
The advantage of the Fed setting an interest rate target (provided it 
follows  a rule to track the interest rate that keeps aggregate demand equal 
to the ability of the economy to produce, the natural rate), is that it 
automatically accommodates changes in households’ demand for bank 
deposits (money). The year 2020 experienced a huge increase in the demand 
for money and the banks met the demand through the magic of bookkeeping 
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entries. The question for 2021 is how the Fed reverses the bulge in money 
when the demand for money reverses. That reversal in demand will come 
with a return of confidence, a surge in spending, and renewed optimism 
about the future, and necessarily a higher natural rate of interest. With a 
higher natural rate of interest, to reverse the bulge in money, the Fed will 
need to implement some combination of raising the funds rate and returning 
the size of its portfolio to the prepandemic level. 
To make the argument specific, imagine a counterfactual associated with 
a Cares Act payment made in March 2020 financed entirely by issuance of 
government debt. The household receives an electronic deposit, and its bank 
receives an equal amount of reserves held at the Fed.  The payment reduces 
the Treasury’s account at the Fed (the Treasury General Account or TGA). 
By assumption, the Treasury issues a security to the public to replenish the 
account. Bank deposits and reserves then decline to their original level while 
the public holds more Treasury debt, presumably at the prevailing low level 
of interest rates as the demand for savings increased.  When confidence 
returns in the post-pandemic world, households will attempt to increase 
their spending by selling the Treasury securities they acquired. For those 
sales to find public buyers, interest rates will have to rise. Dissaving requires 
saving, which moderates the spending spree and restrains inflation. 
As actually happened, however, to replenish the TGA, in 2020, the 
Treasury effectively sold securities to the Fed because of the Fed’s large open 
market purchases. Bank deposits and reserves then increased. The portfolios 
of investors became more liquid with the replacement of an MBS or Treasury 
bond with a deposit. Through portfolio rebalancing, investors then bid up 
the prices of assets like houses and equities. When confidence returns and 
households want to spend down their pandemic-augmented deposits, the 
analogue to the above of households selling Treasury securities is for the Fed 
to sell securities from its portfolio. Some households must save to buy those 
securities. Again, dissaving is countered by saving, which moderates the 
spending spree and restrains inflation. If the Fed does not unwind its 
portfolio, it will have to compensate by raising interest rates to a greater 
extent than assumed in the above counterfactual example to match an 
increase in the natural rate of interest. 
As of early 2021, monetary policy was stimulative, just as the FOMC 
intended.  Sustained Fed purchases of MBS and Treasury securities of $120 
billion a month continued to make investors’ portfolios more liquid causing 
them to rebalance their portfolios by demanding long-term assets and 
bidding up their prices. House prices and stock markets boomed, 
commodity prices rose sharply, and the dollar depreciated. Activity outside 
the service sector was extremely strong. A measure of expected inflation (the 
10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate minus the 10-year Treasury 
Inflation Indexed Security Rate) rose back to its 2018 level of 2%. 
 With no increase in interest rates, monetary policy will become more 
stimulative when confidence returns with widespread vaccination and the 
service sector reopens. As long as the FOMC does not allow the funds rate 
to rise to give households an incentive to save and pay down debt, money 
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balances (the deposits at banks, M2) will pass around like a hot potato. The 
purchasing power from the 2020 money bulge will be eliminated by 
inflation. 
The FOMC believes that it can run the economy “hot” and reduce the 
unemployment rate to a low level while engineering a controlled increase in 
inflation moderately above 2%. It believes that it can move the 
unemployment rate down a flat Phillips curve to achieve low unemployment 
and moderate inflation. Whether the Fed can exercise this degree of control 
over the economy and balance off the competing goals of unemployment 
and inflation comprised the heart of the monetarist-Keynesian debate in the 
1970s. The chances for mistakes increase because of the discretion inherent 
in a policy of trying to juggle low unemployment and low inflation. 
The question is what happens to interest rates and inflation when 
confidence returns and the public runs down the liquid assets accumulated 
during the pandemic. That spending surge should occur by early summer.  
Initially, there will likely be a feeling of euphoria and an increase in inflation 
believed to be a one-time-phenomenon. That will be positive for markets and 
the natural rate of interest will rise. 
The question then is whether the anticipated rise in prices will be a one-
time event. For that to happen, the FOMC will have to raise interest rates to 
extinguish the bulge in deposits that occurred in 2020. That preemptive 
move seems unlikely given the FOMC’s pursuit of an inclusive goal for 
maximum employment. If so, the FOMC will be unable to achieve the 
moderate increase in inflation it desires but will overshoot significantly.   
 
3. A monetary standard organized around monetary 
control 
The monetary standard explains how the actions of the central bank 
translate into the behavior of firms and households. To understand the 
nature of the monetary standard, one must explain how the central bank 
varies its instrument in response to incoming information on the economy 
given its objectives—the reaction function. One must then explain how the 
reaction function works to produce the desired collective behavior of firms 
and households given the structure of the economy. 
In particular, the monetary standard elucidates the influence of the central 
bank over the nominal (dollar) expenditure of agents. That influence must 
be indirect rather than one of direct control. There is no wartime rationing or 
centralized control of production. There are no wartime price controls. The 
central bank does not directly control the nominal expenditure of agents and 
the price-setting of firms. That is, it must work through the operation of the 
price system and through expectations of the future behavior of the central 
bank.   
A monetary standard that provides for macroeconomic stability 
incorporates a rule that disciplines the consistency of the behavior of the 
central bank over time (its reaction function).  Implicit in the choice of an 
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optimal rule is an understanding of the structure of the economy. The 
monetarist-Keynesian debate advanced competing visions. 
Monetarists place monetary control at the center of monetary policy.  The 
responsibility of the central bank is to discipline the bookkeeping operations 
of banks that create bank deposits (money). The implication of controlling 
something nominal rather than real is letting the price system work to 
control real variables. In contrast, Keynesians place nominal-real trade-offs 
at the center of monetary policy. The responsibility of the central bank is to 
vary nominal expenditure to balance off achievement of competing goals 
between a real variable (unemployment) and a nominal variable (prices). The 
Phillips curve expresses the relevant trade-offs.  Keynesians believe that the 
central bank should supersede the working of the price system to achieve a 
desirable balance between inflation and unemployment. 
One needs a model to understand the monetary standard both in terms of 
how the actual standard has evolved over time and in terms of an optimal 
standard by which to assess the impact of the different actual standards. The 
big tent model used by economists is the New Keynesian (NK) model.  
However, such models are completely general. The issue is how to choose 
between competing versions under the assumption that formal methods of 
estimation will fail to distinguish between alternative versions but rather 
will fit all versions to the time series.   
 
4. From monetarism to the basic New Keynesian DSGE 
model  
Friedman (1960) is famous for his advocacy of a  rule for steady money 
growth.  What does the rule say about the monetarist underlying model of 
the economy? A core principle of monetarism is that the ideal monetary 
standard implements a “classical dichotomy.” The central bank should 
provide a stable nominal anchor and then turn the determination of real 
variables over to the operation of the market economy. The price system 
works well to stabilize the economy provided the central bank operates with 
a rule that supplies a stable nominal anchor. 
Friedman’s steady money growth rule would provide a nominal anchor.  
At the time of its formulation, given the stability and interest insensitivity of 
real money demand and given steady growth in potential real output, the 
rule would have ensured steady trend growth in nominal expenditure and 
in inflation. That is, it would have supplied a stable nominal anchor.  The 
rule would have allowed the price system to determine relative prices and 
real variables. The separation of the determination of relative prices from the 
behavior of the absolute price level has always been the desideratum of 
quantity theorists. Of course, controversy arose from the challenge by the 
Keynesian consensus that a free-market economy was inherently unstable 
and left alone would yield long periods of unemployment above full 
employment.   
Friedman proposed his rule as an alternative to Keynesian aggregate 
demand management in which the Fed would set an explicit target for a 
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macroeconomic variable and then use a feedback rule to eliminate deviations 
of the variable from its targeted value.  In the 1970s, although the FOMC 
never articulated explicit values for targets for unemployment and inflation, 
it understood policy as targeting the competing goals of price stability and 
full employment (4 percent unemployment) subject to the trade-offs 
embodied in the Phillips curve. Friedman illustrated his critique using an 
explicit value for a stable price level as the target variable. The critique later 
gained the moniker of “long and variable lags.” 
Friedman (1960, 87-88) wrote: 
The Federal Reserve System does not control the price level.  It controls the 
volume of its own earning assets and, at one remove… the stock of money.  
[T]he link between the stock of money and the price level … is not direct 
and rigid, nor is it fully understood.  While the stock of money is 
systematically related to the price level on the average, there is much 
variation in the relation over short periods of time…. [T]here is much 
evidence that monetary changes have their effect only after a considerable 
lag and over a long period and that the lag is rather variable. (italics in 
original) 
The basic New Keynesian (NK) model as exposited by Goodfriend & King 
(1997) makes price-level stability the optimal policy. This model is taken as 
embodying the “classical dichotomy” advanced by monetarists.  It will then 
be necessary to explain how the FOMC can implement a rule that provides 
for price-level stability without running afoul of the Friedman critique.   
 
5. The NK model 
Understanding the monetary standard requires a model to separate 
causation from correlation. That is, a model is about identification. A model 
organizes variables into those that are endogenously determined as part of 
the working of the working of the price system and those that are 
exogenously determined outside of it. One of the great intellectual 
achievements of modern macroeconomics is the DSGE (dynamic, stochastic, 
general equilibrium model) model. Such models with their forward-looking 
agents are ideal for studying monetary economics. One reason is that money 
possesses value in exchange because people expect it to possess value in the 
future. 
At the same time, NK models are completely general.  An NK model is 
not identified in that one can take it to the data and reject it or evaluate it 
relative to other models. All models fit the data in the sense of explaining the 
historical time series. The model builder (econometrician) chooses equations 
with an eye to the data. For consumption, there is habit persistence, for 
investment there is time to build, for inflation there are rule-of-thumb price 
setters, and so on.  Most important, because each sector of a DSGE model 
comes with its own shock, there will always be some constellation of shocks 
that will make the model fit the historical time series.  An illustration used 
by Chari, Kehoe, & McGrattan (2009) is that the Great Contraction from 1929 
to 1933 can be explained equally well in DSGE models by an increased 
preference for leisure or by increased monopoly power of wage setters 
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(unions). In the absence of a supportive narrative (increased demand for 
resorts or increased unionization), they regard neither explanation as 
credible.  
Moreover, the reaction functions chosen for the central bank by the 
econometricians who construct models are reduced forms not structural 
equations. The reactions functions assume a knowledge of the structure of 
the economy not possessed by policymakers.  In real time, policymakers do 
not know the output gap. They do not know the values of any natural 
variables, that is, the market-determined values of real variables in the 
absence of nominal price rigidities.  By default, in actual practice, a central 
bank reaction function must constitute a search procedure to discover the 
natural rate of interest.   
One way to choose between versions of the NK model is to determine 
which one is most useful in organizing a historical narrative explaining when 
the behavior of the central bank has been stabilizing and when it has been 
destabilizing. A historical narrative imposes a discipline that shocks cannot 
be completely ad hoc but must correspond to a variety of information 
contemporaneously available. The version of the NK model exposited by 
Goodfriend & King (1997) usefully organizes a monetarist narrative.  It 
supports the monetarist hypothesis that the optimal rule is one in which the 
central bank maintains a stable nominal anchor in the form of the expectation 
of price stability and allows the price system to work to determine real 
variables. 
In the Goodfriend-King version, there exists only one nominal friction.  
Namely, firms can only reset dollar prices at infrequent intervals. If the 
central bank follows a rule that implements price stability, it neutralizes the 
friction. As shown in equation (3) of footnote 1, with actual and expected 
inflation equal to zero, the output gap, which is the difference between actual 
and potential output, is zero.2  Relative prices and the value of real variables 
then are determined solely by the real business cycle core of the economy.  
 
2 The exposition here uses the notation in Barsky et al (2014).  The real rate of interest, tr , is 
1t t t tr i E    , where ti is the market rate of interest and 1t tE   is expected inflation.  The 
natural rate of interest, n




t t t tr s E y

    
where n
ty  is the natural rate of output, t  is the subjective rate of time preference, and s  is 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.  The output gap equals 
~
n




(2) ( )nt t k t kt
k






That is, the output gap equals the sum of future interest-rate gaps.  Finally, (3) expresses the 
NK Phillips curve. 
~
1(3) [ ]t t t tE k y       
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The term “classical dichotomy” refers to this characteristic of the model. The 
empirical assumption that the price system works well to mitigate the impact 
of real shocks on the output gap given such a rule makes the model 
monetarist in spirit. 
As shown in equation (2) of the footnote, a rule that maintains the output 
gap equal to zero through price stability is equivalent to a rule that maintains 
actual and expected real rates of interest equal to their natural counterparts.  
As Barsky et al. (2014, 38) note, “[An] interest rate path in which the actual 
real rate is always equal to the natural rate achieves both an output gap of 
zero … and zero inflation.” Because the Fed does not literally target a 
constant price level, one must explain when its procedures do and do not 
work to track the natural rate of interest. Since the 1951 Treasury-Fed 
Accord, the Fed has followed lean-against-the-wind (LAW) procedures. 
Giving empirical content to the Barsky et al. (2014) statement requires an 
empirical generalization identifying a baseline LAW procedure that is 
consistent with economic stability and that flags departures from the 
baseline that predict instability. When do LAW procedures track the natural 
rate of interest and when do they fail? Addressing this question explains how 
the Fed can pursue price stability while avoiding Friedman’s long-and-
variable-lag critique.    
 
6. LAW with credibility and LAW with trade-offs 
(cyclical inertia) 
Formula (4) serves as a benchmark for the FOMC’s LAW procedures.  
They can be understood as a search procedure for discovering the natural 
rate of interest.3 
 
*
1 3| 3|3 3| |0.5( *) 0.5( ) 0.5t t t t t tt t t ti i y y og             (4) 
ti is the funds rate for quarter t. 3|t t  is forecasted inflation three quarters 
ahead, and 
*  is the inflation target. 
*
3 3| |( )t t t ty y   is the forecasted three-
quarter ahead GDP growth minus potential GDP growth.  Real GDP and 
potential GDP (in logarithms) are tq and 
*
tq .  (The    logarithmic differences are 
percentage changes.)   Quarterly annualized real GDP growth is
1( ) 400,t t ty q q x   and the potential growth counterpart is 
* * *
1( ) 400t t ty q q x  . 
*
3| 3|t t t ty y   is forecasted three-quarters-ahead 
quarterly real GDP growth relative to potential growth.  The output gap is 
*( ) 100t t tog q q x  . 
Formula (4) captures the character of LAW procedures, which are in 
practice based on forecasts of the behavior of the economy.  Although 
forecasting is a problematic exercise, what is important is that LAW 
procedures possess the characteristic of “guess and correct” as new 
information on the economy arrives.  Financial markets understand FOMC 
 
3 See Orphanides (2019) for a discussion of such first-difference rules. 
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procedures and continually respond to incoming news on the economy in a 
way that moves the yield curve based on forecasts of the FOMC’s anticipated 
funds rate path.  In this way, if the FOMC reaction function is stabilizing, the 
yield curve moves continually in a way that stabilizes economic activity. A 
sympathetic way to understand rejection by FOMC participants of 
“mechanical rules” is that the forecasting effort involves an exhaustive 
review of economic data supplemented by anecdotal information about the 
economy gleaned by regional Bank presidents from their business contacts. 
Only such extensive discussion can allow the FOMC to reach a consensus 
over the extent to which fluctuations in output represent sustained or 
transitory movements. 
As expressed in (4), with LAW, the FOMC moves the funds rate relative 
to its current value to counter sustained changes in the economy’s rate of 
resource utilization.  It moves the funds rate to maintain 
*
3|3|( ) 0t tt ty y    .  
Implicitly, sustained changes in rates of resource utilization indicate a real 
interest rate that differs from the natural rate of interest. Output cannot grow 
indefinitely above trend without raising inflation; conversely, output cannot 
grow indefinitely below trend without causing disinflation.  Translating that 
assumption into practice leads to two different versions of LAW: LAW with 
credibility and LAW with trade-offs. Those different versions form the basis 
for the identification scheme used to determine when FOMC procedures are 
stabilizing (track the natural rate of interest) and destabilizing (fail to track 
the natural rate of interest).  
Consider how LAW with credibility works in practice starting from the 
trough of a recession. When the FOMC feels assured that the recovery is 
sustainable, that is, the second right-hand term in (4) will remain positive 
despite measured, persistent increases in the funds rate, it begins to raise its 
funds rate target. With 
*
3|3|( ) 0t tt ty y    , the FOMC begins to raise the funds 
rate.  In the background, the FOMC has an estimate of the magnitude of the 
output gap, tog  but measured only with great imprecision. As the recovery 
proceeds and when the FOMC sees signs of stress on rates of resource 
utilization, especially, overheating in the labor market, it forecasts inflation, 
that is, 
3|( *) 0t t    . With both terms in (4) positive, the FOMC raises the 
funds rate in a decided way to avoid the actual realization of inflation. The 
intention is to achieve a glide path that causes real output to move to 
potential without an overshoot and then for output to grow at potential. 
In the contrasting monetary standard, the FOMC believes that it can 
manage inflation-output trade-offs.  In practice, LAW with trade-offs is the 
equivalent of LAW with cyclical inertia in the funds rate target. In an 
economic recovery, the FOMC’s behavior is different in response to signs of 
stress on rates of resource utilization. Now, the FOMC acts not based on 
forecasts of inflation but rather based on actual inflation. During economic 
recovery, the predominant concern is with raising the funds rate too strongly 
and slowing the recovery before attaining full employment (the go phases). 
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The FOMC becomes willing to raise the funds rate significantly only with the 
actual appearance of inflation. 
In practice, it has then raised the funds rate until recession developed (the 
stop phases). Out of fear of sending the wrong signal about the inflation rate 
it would tolerate and thus risking a permanent rise in expected inflation, the 
FOMC began to lower the funds rate only when a serious recession became 
evident. The narrative here associates LAW with credibility with the 
Volcker-Greenspan era known as the Great Moderation.  It associates LAW 
with  trade-offs with the stop-go era when the FOMC attempted to balance 
off objectives for inflation and an output gap. 
LAW with credibility emerged during the Volcker-Greenspan era.  The 
objective of policy changed to maintaining low, stable expected inflation—
that is, to the restoration of the nominal expectational stability lost with the 
prior go-stop monetary policy. LAW with credibility imposed two kinds of 
discipline. The first came from the need to eliminate the market’s association 
between cyclical strength in the economy and the later emergence of 
inflation. To eliminate this association, the FOMC had to remove from its 
interest rate target the cyclical inertia that had characterized the earlier 
period. The second kind of discipline came from the need to eliminate the 
extrapolation by financial markets of actual inflation to expected inflation. 
The FOMC moved therefore to a policy of preemptive funds rate increases 
so that the inflation did not emerge.  During economic recoveries, it raised 
rates in response to cyclically tight labor markets, treating them as a 
harbinger of inflation and a disappearing negative output gap.  In the 
Volcker-Greenspan era, the FOMC also treated “inflation scares,” discrete 
rises in bond rates, as evidence of positive future inflation, 
3|( *) 0t t    . 
The optimal monetarist rule is that the FOMC should provide a stable 
nominal anchor and then allow markets to determine real variables like 
unemployment. To understand why the FOMC can treat the inflation and 
output terms in (4) as determined independently, it is useful to supplement 
the basic NK model as exposited by Goodfriend-King (1997) with the Aoki 
(2001) version containing a sticky-price sector and a flexible-price sector.  
Firms in the sticky-price sector are constrained to change prices only 
infrequently. Firms in the flexible-price sector operate in auction markets in 
which prices are determined continuously. To allow the price system to 
determine relative prices, the central bank should focus on inflation in the 
sticky-price sector and allow inflation originating in the flexible-price sector 
to pass through to headline inflation. 
The central bank does not trade off between inflation and output 
(unemployment) gaps. In this Goodfriend-King/Aoki world, the optimal 
rule provides a stable nominal anchor in the form of nominal expectational 
stability and then allows the price system to determine real variables—a 
classical dichotomy. It turns the determination of real variables over to the 
operation of the price system through procedures that cause the real funds 
rate to track the natural rate of interest, where the latter is the real interest 
rate (actual and expected) that maintains real aggregate demand equal to 
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potential output (the output gap equal to zero). In this way, LAW with 
credibility avoids the Friedman long and variable lags critique.  Because the 
rule causes the real funds rate to track the natural rate, it does not introduce 
monetary policy actions as a distinct source of disruption to the operation of 
the price system.  
In this monetary standard, the FOMC controls trend inflation through its 
control of the difference between nominal and real expenditure. The price 
system determines real expenditure. The FOMC controls trend inflation 
through a credible rule that causes firms in the sticky-price sector to 
coordinate on the same expectation of inflation in setting prices for multiple 
periods. Nominal expenditure is determined as the sum of real expenditure 
and the inflation set by this expectation (plus the noise in the inflation series). 
The control of inflation does not require that the FOMC exercise control over 
the real-nominal trade-offs summarized in Phillips curves. 
With the classical-dichotomy version of the NK model, monetary stability 
eliminates the correlations of the Phillips curve. The revision to the FOMC’s 
Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy announced 
August 27, 2020 by chair Powell (8/27/2020), however, made a flat Phillips 
curve a key element of FOMC strategy.  The FOMC interpreted the decline 
in unemployment without a corresponding increase in inflation in the 
recovery from the Great Recession as evidence of a flat Phillips curve with 
an upward-sloping section starting at an historically low unemployment 
rate. The issue is whether the correlations expressed in such a Phillips curve 
are structural.  That is, do they represent a relationship between 
unemployment and inflation that the policymaker can use as the basis for a 
controllable and predictable trade-off between the two variables?   
The alternative to a flat Phillips curve as an explanation for the 
disappearance of a predictable relationship between falling unemployment 
and rising inflation is that monetary instability produced the correlations 
formerly observed in the data (Friedman 1968 [1969]). A policy of price 
stability removed those correlations. Atkeson & Ohanian (2001) made this 
point when they observed that lagged inflation did a better job of predicting 
inflation than did Phillips curves, which include resource slack as an 
explanatory variable.  In terms of the Lucas (1976 [1981]) critique, the 
empirical correlations captured by Phillips curves are a reduced form that 
depends upon the behavior of monetary policy. The disappearance of an 
upward sloping Phillips curve emerged from the monetary policy pursued 
in the period known as the Great Moderation.   
Robert Lucas (2007, 92) expressed the idea: 
We now understand that there is no tradeoff [between inflation and 
employment] and periods of price stability are not periods of high 
unemployment or low growth.  There is no systematic connection 
between these two variables.  So when it comes down to the central 
bank, central bankers can and should be and mostly are focusing on the 
control of inflation.  That is their job.  That is their only job. 
In terms of the classical-dichotomy New Keynesian model, in the Great 
Moderation, the nominal expectational stability that stabilized inflation in 
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the sticky-price sector meant that the real sector would operate based on the 
real business cycle core of the economy. The prior relationship between 
inflation and unemployment would disappear. That changing relationship 
did not reflect an evolving economy but rather an evolving monetary policy. 
 
7. Adding money to the NK model 
In the NK model, money is a veil.  With the assumption of rational 
expectations, households, firms, and the central bank understand the 
structure of the economy and know the natural values of real variables.  The 
central bank will follow a rule that causes the real rate of interest to track the 
natural rate of interest. Excess demand in the goods market will not depart 
from zero and consequently excess demands in the bond market and in the 
market for the quantity of money will be negligible. One can ignore these 
markets.  It follows that the NK model by itself cannot explain serious 
monetary disturbances. To explain phenomena like the Great Depression 
and the Great Inflation, for example, it is necessary to resort to the earlier 
monetarist literature, for example, Friedman & Schwartz (1963a and 1963b) 
and Poole (1978). 
 
8. An alternating monetary standard: back to the 1970s? 
LAW with credibility, which enables a classical-dichotomy monetary 
standard, characterized the Volcker-Greenspan era. The discipline required 
to restore nominal expectational stability lost in the prior era required 
abandonment of the policy of activist aggregate demand management in 
which the FOMC tried to balance off the two assumed competing goals of 
price stability and full employment. That discipline required the FOMC to 
allow the price system to determine real variables like employment and 
output through moving the real funds rate in a way that tracked the natural 
rate of interest. 
In a way reminiscent of the 1970s, in August 2020, the FOMC committed 
to achieving a level of inclusive unemployment defined as unemployment 
low enough to achieve the socially desirable goal of low unemployment in 
minority neighborhoods. A flat Phillips curve will allow the FOMC to push 
the unemployment rate down to such a low level without inflation.  After 
inflation has persistently exceeded the FOMC’s 2% inflation target, monetary 
policy becomes “flexible” (discretionary). That is, the FOMC will balance off 
the competing goals of low unemployment and low inflation. 
Two related factors motivated the change in the Fed’s strategy. The first 
was an expansion of the Fed’s mandate to achieve “maximum employment” 
to include a strong labor market in minority and low-income communities. 
That expansion came from the Fed Listens program to reach out to these 
communities. The second was the experience in the recovery from the Great 
Recession in which the FOMC raised the funds rate and yet inflation 
remained below its 2% objective. The FOMC drew the lesson that increases 
in the funds rate to prevent the emergence of inflation prevented 
achievement of its more inclusive definition of maximum employment. 
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The New Keynesian (NK) model is the big tent model used by 
macroeconomists today.  It is the starting point for clarifying one’s views 
about how the world works but must be supplemented by empirical 
generalization. The reason is that the assumption of rational expectations 
rules out monetary instability as a cause of real instability. All the agents 
(households, firms, and the central bank) know the structure of the economy.  
The result is built in that money is basically a veil.   
A central bank with a target for price stability does not literally have a 
simple feedback rule with which it moves its instrument (the funds) rate in 
response to deviations of the price level from a fixed value. The basic NK 
model needs to be supplemented with the Aoki (2001) version containing a 
sticky-price sector and a flexible-price sector. Firms in the sticky-price sector 
are constrained to change prices only infrequently.  Firms in the flexible-
price sector operate in auction markets in which prices are determined 
continuously. 
To allow the price system to determine relative prices, the central bank 
should control inflation in the sticky-price sector and allow inflation 
originating in the flexible-price sector to pass through to headline inflation.  
It can do so indirectly through a credible rule that conditions the price setting 
of firms in the sticky-price sector. The central bank then turns the 
determination of real variables over to the operation of the price system 
through procedures that cause the real funds rate to track the natural rate of 
interest, where the latter is the real interest rate (actual and expected) that 
maintains real aggregate demand equal to potential output (maintains the 
output gap equal to zero). 
This monetary policy characterized the Volcker-Greenspan era.  In that 
era, the discipline required to restore nominal expectational stability lost in 
the prior era required abandonment of the policy of activist aggregate 
demand management in which the FOMC tried to balance off the two 
assumed competing goals of price stability and full employment. That 
discipline required the FOMC to follow a rule to restore nominal 
expectational stability while allowing the price system to determine real 
variables like employment and output. The FOMC controls trend inflation 
through a credible rule that causes firms in the sticky-price sector to 
coordinate on the same expectation of inflation in setting prices for multiple 
periods. Trend inflation emerges as the difference between nominal and real 
expenditure while the price system determines real expenditure. The control 
of inflation then does not require that the FOMC exercise control over the 
real-nominal trade-offs summarized in Phillips curves. 
 
10. FOMC Commentary 
Chair Powell (1/14/2021) explained how the new strategy is based on a 
structural Phillips curve that is flat down to a very low level of 
unemployment and that lacks inflation persistence: 
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[W]e have a flat Phillips curve, meaning there’s still a small connection 
but you need a microscope to find it between slack in the labor market 
and inflation.  We’ve also got low persistence of inflation, so that if 
inflation were to go up for any reason it doesn’t follow – inflation 
doesn’t stay up.… Remember, we’re a long way from maximum 
employment.  There’s plenty of slack in the labor market.  [It is] 
unlikely that wage pressures are going to be reaching a level that would 
create/support higher inflation. 
An implication of a flat Phillips curve is that an expansionary monetary 
policy can push the unemployment rate to low levels without danger of an 
undesirably large increases in inflation. Richard Clarida (2021), Board of 
Governors vice chair, explained how this assumption meant that the FOMC 
would not raise the funds rate off the ZLB in response to declines in the 
unemployment rate. He highlighted the change in the wording of the 
FOMC’s “Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy” of  
“ ‘shortfalls’ of employment from its maximum level’—not ‘deviations.’  This 
language means that going forward, a low unemployment rate, in and of 
itself, will not be sufficient to trigger a tightening of monetary 
policy….”  (italics in original) 
Specifically, the FOMC rejected the Volcker-Greenspan policy of 
preemptive increases in the funds rate to prevent the emergence of inflation.  
As summarized by Larry Meyer (LHM 11/20/2020): “The switch to a 
maximum employment threshold reflects that, while a rise in the 
unemployment rate is always ‘bad’ in the normal [new] regime, a decline in 
the unemployment rate is always ‘good.’ Given that a lower unemployment 
rate is recognized as always good, there is no preemptive rise in the funds rate 
when the unemployment rate falls….” (italics in original) 
Lael Brainard (1/31/2021) made clear that the FOMC treats inclusive 
employment as an independent goal: 
Two years ago, the Federal Reserve began an in-depth review of its 
monetary policy framework…. Our review was prompted by changes 
in key long-run features of the economy: The recognition that price 
inflation is much less sensitive to labor market tightness than 
historically—that is, a flat Phillips curve…. In response, we have made 
changes to monetary policy that can be expected to support fuller and 
broader-based employment than in earlier recoveries, improving 
opportunities for workers who have faced structural challenges in the 
labor market…. The new policy approach, by avoiding the need to 
tighten preemptively, could support labor market conditions that help 
to reduce persistent disparities.  
Mary Daly (2021), president of the San Francisco Fed, reiterated the 
abandonment of preemption: 
We are not going to … take the punch bowl away from the economy 
when we have inflation running consistently below 2 percent … just 
because we get to the levels of unemployment that have traditionally, 
historically meant that wage inflation would push up and that price 
inflation would be right behind it…. In an era when we have a pretty 
flat Phillips curve, and I want to add for full disclosure I still believe in 
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the Phillips curve, … what we have learned [is that] the labor market is 
far more elastic than we thought. 
Lael Brainard (2020) of the Board of Governors repeated the same 
argument: 
And with inflation exhibiting low sensitivity to labor market tightness, 
policy should not preemptively withdraw support based on a 
historically steeper Phillips curve that is not currently in evidence.  
Instead, policy should seek to achieve employment outcomes with the 
kind of breadth and depth that were only achieved late in the previous 
recovery.  
LHM (7/21/2020) noted, “That’s fully in line with what Powell has 
previously said.” 
The new strategy builds in the committed forward guidance that makes 
monetary policy expansionary at the ZLB.  In a June 10, 2020, press 
conference, Powell (Board of Governors 6/10/2020) noted that in the pre-
pandemic period the unemployment rate was extremely low (3.5 percent in 
February 2020) and inflation never exceeded 2 percent. The implication was 
that the FOMC could maintain the funds rate at the ZLB at least until the 
unemployment rate approached its pre-pandemic level.  Powell (Board of 
Governors Press Conference 6/10/2020, 9–10) stated: 
We saw a lot of great things happening in the [pre-pandemic] labor 
market, things that we’d love to get back to.  We didn’t see any 
problems with price inflation.. . . [W]e’d. . . welcome very low readings 
. . . on unemployment just based on what we . . . saw . . . in the last 
expansion. . . . We’re not even thinking about thinking about raising 
rates. 
Charles Evans (2021, 7-8), president of the Chicago Fed, explained the 
strategy: 
The first prong calls for the federal funds rate to remain at the effective 
lower bound until our employment mandate is met and inflation 
reaches 2 percent and is on target to overshoot.  Then, the second prong 
involves increasing the federal funds rate slowly enough to maintain 
the accommodation needed to achieve moderate overshooting for some 
time, so that inflation actually averages 2 percent.  And last month we 
augmented this with guidance saying we will maintain our current 
pace of asset purchases until substantial further progress has been 
made toward our maximum and inclusive employment and price 
stability goals.  For this approach to be successful, economic agents 
must have strong confidence that policy will remain sufficiently 
accommodative to generate these outcomes. 
Evans (2021, 8) also wrote: 
It will take years to get average inflation up to 2 percent, which means 
that monetary policy will be accommodative for a long time.  This 
translates into low-for-long policy rates, and indicates that the Fed will 
be continuing our current asset purchase program for a while as well.  
So economic agents should be prepared for a period of very low interest 
rates and an expanding Fed balance sheet….  
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